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Abstract—Robust belief revision methods are crucial in stream-
ing data situations for updating existing knowledge (or beliefs)
with new incoming evidence. Bayes conditioning is the primary
mechanism in use for belief revision in data fusion systems
that use probabilistic inference. However, traditional conditioning
methods face several challenges due to inherent data/source
imperfections in big-data environments that harness soft (i.e.,
human or human-based) sources in addition to hard (i.e., physics-
based) sensors. The objective of this paper is to investigate the
most natural extension of Bayes conditioning that is suitable
for evidence updating in the presence of such uncertainties. By
viewing the evidence updating process as a thought experiment,
an elegant strategy is derived for robust evidence updating in
the presence of extreme uncertainties that are characteristic of
big-data environments. In particular, utilizing the Fagin-Halpern
conditional notions, a natural extension to Bayes conditioning
is derived for evidence that takes the form of a general belief
function. The presented work differs fundamentally from the
Conditional Update Equation (CUE) and authors own extensions
of it. An overview of this development is provided via illustrative
examples. Furthermore, insights into parameter selection under
various fusion contexts are also provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Overview. It’s a streaming world—from financial markets
to transportation to health monitoring to e-commerce appli-
cations, most of today’s data are generated and received in
real-time as streams [1]. With real-time processing bearing the
promise of improved efficiency and creating new opportunities
many application domains, stream processing [2]–[4] has
become the latest trend in the big-data world. The ability
to predict future system states from real-time data streams
while automatically accounting for data distribution drifts via
a ‘single-pass’ processing of data [5] is a critical step in
developing robust streaming processing methods for reasoning
upon rapidly changing information. In particular, it is often
required to ‘refine’ existing knowledge (e.g., about a state of
the system), commonly referred to as evidence updating (or
belief revision) as new evidence is generated [6]. To preserve
the integrity of data fusion [7], adequately accounting for
numerous uncertainties [8] is paramount, especially in big-data
environments where soft (i.e., human or human-based) sources
are frequently utilized in addition to hard (i.e., physics-
based) sensors. Among many uncertainty modeling/handling
methodologies, notions of probability are very much likely
to play a major role in big-data approaches as (a) data are
intrinsically probabilistic in nature and (b) ability of prob-
abilistic approaches in reducing the size of the input data
that is needed to be processed (by each machine) through
randomization techniques. In this paper, we present a new
evidence updating scheme that is derived as a natural extension
of Bayes conditioning, the primary belief revision mechanism
utilized in probability theory [9]–[14], to tackle the challenges
associated with belief revision in such big-data environments.
Background. Conditioning [15]–[17] is the primary method
for belief revision in a vast majority of data fusion [7], [18],
[19] systems which employ probabilistic inferencing [20]–
[28]. As new evidence becomes available, existing belief of
the propositions of interest (e.g., state of a sensor or agent,
knowledge-base (KB), etc.) are updated (or revised) to reflect
the new evidence. In probability theory, the Bayes conditional
accomplishes exactly this task. Let us consider the following
example to illustrate the classical belief revision process.
Example 1 (MVP Poll). Consider a sports news agency
that maintains a KB of current voter preferences for the top
five candidates Θ ≡ {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5} for the most valuable
player (MVP) award of a basketball league. The agency
maintains an up-to-date KB via a probability mass function
(pmf) Pk(), where k is the discrete time index for current time
tk. The agency generates Pk() by aggregating predictions
generated by various sports analysts. Suppose the players c1
and c2 get injured early in the season. Now, the agency con-
cludes with 100% certainty that the two players will not play
for the remainder of the season. Therefore, the KB is updated
to reflect these changes by conditioning Pk() with respect to
(w.r.t.) the conditioning event A = Θ \ {c1, c2} = {c3, c4, c5}
thus yielding
Pk+1(ci) = Pk(ci | A) = Pk(ci ∩A)
Pk(A)
, i = 1, . . . , 5, (1)
where Pk+1() denotes the updated voter preference.
Evidence updating in fusion engines that utilize probabilis-
tic inferencing is often carried out in a similar fashion to
Example 1, where existing beliefs are conditioned w.r.t. an
event A that characterizes the changes to existing “conditions.”
However, it is often difficult to characterize such changes via a
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single event in complex sensing and fusion situations that are
characteristic of big-data environments [29], especially when
non-traditional sources of evidence (e.g., soft data in the forms
of witness reports, expert opinions, blogs, etc.) are also being
used for gathering evidence [30]. The evidence provided by
such sources are often complex data structures that are difficult
to represent via a single event with certainty or even via a
probabilistic model. For instance, given the injuries to players
c1 and c2 in Example 1, a sports analyst A∗ may very well
conclude that “with a 75% confidence, c1 and c2 will not
return and in that case c3 will most likely be the MVP” (see
Example 2).
c1
c4 c2c3
c5
⇥ = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}
A = {c1, c2, c3}
(a) hard evidence
⇥ = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}
c1
c2c3
c5
c4
A2 = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}
A1 = {c1, c2, c3}
(b) soft evidence
Fig. 1. Conditioning in big-data environments for MVP poll in Example 1
and Example 2. Fig. (a) shows the classical Bayes conditioning, where
the conditioning event A has occurred with certainty. Fig. (b) shows a
soft environment where preferences are assigned to ‘composite’ sets (see
Example 2) and, changes to existing conditions are captured via conditioning
events A1 and A2 with 75% and 25% confidence, respectively.
Challenges. The difficulties associated with evidence up-
dating in such complex environments is rooted in the types
of data/source imperfections that we may encounter. Given
the very nature of big-data (viz., subjective, qualitative, and
unstructured), one may be reluctant to revise existing beliefs
with complete certainty (w.r.t. a single conditioning event).
Furthermore, one must also take into account the differ-
ences in data sources, such as the reliability of the evidence
source, credibility of the evidence, and frame of discernment
(FoD) (i.e., the scope of source expertise). Purely probabilistic
methods may pose several challenges in terms of adequately
representing complex data uncertainties (that are characteristic
of such data) in order to generate inferences that are robust
against such data/source imperfections. Given the fact that vast
majority of existing hard data (i.e., data generated by conven-
tional physics-based sensors) fusion and tracking systems are
based on probabilistic methods, a complete transition to a new
framework, which does not support probabilistic inferencing,
may also not be a feasible option.
Contributions. By viewing the evidence updating process
as a thought experiment, we devise an elegant strategy for
robust evidence updating in the presence of extreme uncertain-
ties. With a belief theoretic [31] core, our proposed method
generalizes the belief theoretic Fagin-Halpern conditional no-
tions [15], thus allowing one to account for various data/source
imperfections that are characteristic to complex soft/hard data
fusion environments. Furthermore, a novel data fusion rule is
derived as a natural extension of these ideas. The presented
extension differs fundamentally from the previously published
work on Conditional Update Equation (CUE) as appeared
in [32], [33], including the authors own work in [8], [34],
[35]. However, it can be thought of as an extension of [36].
In this paper, we provide an overview for the development
of generalized conditional approach via illustrative examples.
Then, we derive several algebraic and fusion properties of the
new approach and compare them to the properties of CUE.
Moreover, we provide insights into where each fusion rule
may apply and also provide insights for parameter selection
under various fusion contexts.
II. PRELIMINARIES
a) Basic Notions: Let Θ ≡ {θ1, . . . , θn} denote the
total set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions. In
DS theory, Θ is referred to as Frame of Discernment (FoD),
where a proposition θi referred to as a singleton represents the
lowest level of discernible information. We use |Θ| and 2Θ to
denote the cardinality and the power set of Θ, respectively.
Elements in 2Θ form all the propositions of interest in DS
theory. When the FoD is clear from the context, we use
B to denote all singletons in Θ that are not included in
B; otherwise, we indicate these singletons via Θ\B. The
‘support’ for proposition B is provided via a basic probability
assignment (BPA) or mass assignment:
Definition 1 (BPA or Mass Assignment). The mapping m :
2Θ 7→ [0, 1] is a BPA for the FoD Θ if m(∅) = 0 and∑
B⊆Θm(B) = 1.
A proposition receiving a positive BPA is referred to as
a focal element; the set of focal elements is the core F;
the triple {Θ,F ,m} is the corresponding body of evidence
(BoE). The mass assigned to a proposition is free to move into
the individual singleton objects that constitute the composite
proposition thus generating the notion of ignorance. Indeed,
complete lack of evidence to discern among the propositions
can be conveniently captured via the vacuous BoE where the
FoD Θ itself is the only focal element (i.e., m(Θ) = 1).
b) Belief and Plausibility: While m(B) measures the
support assigned to proposition B only, the belief assigned to
B takes into account the supports for all proper subsets of B
as well. In other words, Bl(B) represents the total support that
can move into B without any ambiguity; and Pl(B) represents
the extent to which one finds B plausible.
Definition 2 (Belief and Plausibility). For B ⊆ Θ in the BoE
{Θ,F ,m}, Bl : 2Θ 7→ [0, 1] where Bl(B) =∑C⊆Bm(C) is
the belief of B; and Pl : 2Θ 7→ [0, 1] where Pl(B) = 1−Bl(B)
is the plausibility of B.
When each focal set contains only one element, i.e.,
m(B) = 0, ∀|B| 6= 1, belief functions become probability
functions. In such a case, the BPA, belief and plausibility
all reduce to probability. A probability distribution Pr(·) such
that Bl(B) ≤ Pr(B) ≤ Pl(B), ∀B ⊆ Θ, is said to be
compatible with the underlying BPA m(·). An example of
such a probability distribution is the pignistic probability
distribution BetP(·) [37]
BetP(θi) =
∑
θi∈B⊆Θ
m(B)
|B| . (2)
c) Conditional Notions: Let Fˆ denote the set of propo-
sitions with non-zero belief, i.e., Fˆ = {B ⊆ Θ | Bl(B) > 0}.
The Fagin-Halpern (FH) conditional notions in DS theory
[15] are applicable whenever the conditioning proposition A
belongs to Fˆ.
Theorem 1 (Fagin-Halpern (FH) Conditionals). [15] For
the conditioning event A ∈ Fˆ and B ⊂ Θ in the BoE
E = {Θ,F,m}, the conditional belief Bl(B|A) : 2Θ 7→ [0, 1]
and the conditional plausibility Pl(B|A) : 2Θ 7→ [0, 1] of B
given A are
Bl(B|A) = Bl(A ∩B)
Bl(A ∩B) + Pl(A ∩B) ;
Pl(B|A) = Pl(A ∩B)
Pl(A ∩B) + Bl(A ∩B) ,
respectively.
A proposition with positive mass after conditioning is
referred to as a conditional focal element. The collection of
conditional focal elements that are generated with respect to
the conditioning event A is referred to as the conditional core
and denoted by FΘ|A. Thus FΘ|A = {B ⊆ Θ | m(B|A) > 0},
where A ∈ Fˆ and m(·|A) : 2Θ 7→ [0, 1] is the corresponding
conditional BPA related to Bl(·|A) via the Mo¨bius transfor-
mation [31]
m(B|A) =
∑
C⊆B
(−1)|B−C| Bl(C|A), ∀B ⊆ Θ. (3)
d) Evidence Updating: This refers to the process of
updating the evidence in a BoE Ek with evidence received
from another BoE E∗k , to arrive at Ek+1. Here k denote the
discrete update index. We denote this as Ek+1 ≡ Ek C E∗k .
Definition 3 (Conditional Update Equation (CUE)). [33] The
CUE that updates Ek with the evidence in E∗k is
Blk+1(B) = αk Blk(B) +
∑
A∈F∗k
βk(A)Bl
∗
k(B|A),
where the parameters αk, βk() ∈ <+ satisfy αk +∑
A∈F∗k
βk(A) = 1.
The CUE proposed in [33] provides several interesting prop-
erties applicable to the task at hand. However, the updating
mechanism presented in this paper fundamentally differers
from CUE and previous work of the author. In fact, we provide
a comprehensive discussion on these differences and how it
affects the applicability and choice of parameters.
III. CONDITIONING IN SOFT/HARD FUSION
ENVIRONMENTS
As now being frequently harnessed in many big-data en-
vironments, soft data (i.e., human or human-generated) data
plays a crucial role in inferencing tasks primarily due to their
ability to provide complementary (to hard sources) and both
critical and time-sensitive information. However, given the
imperfect nature (subjective, incomplete, unstructured, incon-
sistent, contradictory, etc.) of these data/sources, one may not
wish to sacrifice the integrity of the inferencing task by simply
conditioning an existing KB w.r.t. soft evidence. Here, via
a thought experiment, we develop a generalized conditioning
operation as a direct extension of Bayes conditioning operation
to account for these challenges.
A. The Case of One Conditioning Event
Let us look at a case where the new evidence comes in the
form of an occurrence of one event, but not necessarily with
100% certainty as in the traditional Bayesian conditioning.
Example 2 (MVP Poll v.2). Suppose the sports agency in
Example 1 now maintains voter preferences via DS BoE Ek ≡
{Θ,Fk,mk()} and is interested in updating its KB using the
incoming evidence E∗k from a regional “star” sports analyst
A∗. When c1 and c2 gets injured, A∗ has now inferred that the
two players will not return with 75% confidence. Now, what
is the best strategy to update Ek w.r.t. to recent changes?
Conditioning scenario in Example 2 is clearly different and
rather complicated from that of Example 1, where the existing
KB was simply conditioned w.r.t. and event that characterizes
the changes. Furthermore, the problem at hand is also not an
evidence combination, since the agency is only interested in
updating its voter preference KB using the newly acquired
evidence from A∗. This is a typical scenario in a soft/hard
fusion network, where a node maybe interested in simply
updating its existing state (or beliefs) by “eavesdropping” to
evidence that is being relayed through it.
a) The Probabilistic Case: For illustration purposed, let
us assume that the current voter preferences are stored in KB
as Pk() as in Example 1. In this case, when a conditioning
event, such as A = Θ \ {c1, c2} = {c3, c4, c5} (i.e., c1 and c2
are no longer in the running) is specified with 100% certainty,
one can interpret this as the original FoD being deflated (i.e.,
the # of available candidates are being reduced) to (c3, c4, c5).
Therefore, the conditioning operation, redistributes originally
cast voter preferences, as given by
Pk+1(ci) = Pk(ci | A) = Pk(ci ∩A)
Pk(A)
, i = 1, . . . , 5. (4)
Here, note that conditioning simply normalizes (such that they
sum to 1) the originally cast voter preferences to propositions
c3, c4 and c5, as Pk(c1 ∩A) = Pk(c2 ∩A) = 0.
Now, if the event A = Θ \ {c1, c2} = {c3, c4, c5} only
has 75% confidence (or certainty) associated with it, how
can one update the KB? While a philosophical discussion on
generating the most precise interpretation of “... c1 and c2 will
not return with 75% confidence” is out of the scope of this
paper, it is clear from the context that c1 and c2 will not return
with 75% confidence does not necessarily mean that they they
will return with 25%. Then, as proposed in [36] for updating
in belief functions, one may employ a linear combination to
generate the updated KB:
Pk+1(ci) = αkPk(ci) + βk(A)Pk(ci | A), i = 1, . . . , 5, (5)
where αk+βk(A) = 1. Here, one may utilize βk(A), perhaps
as βk(A) = 0.75 to quantify the confidence on new evidence
assigned by the agent A∗. One may interpret accordingly and
use the parameter α to account for the integrity of existing
KB.
b) Belief theoretic update: Similar to the probabilistic
case, When a conditioning event, such as A = Θ \ {c1, c2} =
{c3, c4, c5} (i.e., c1 and c2 are no longer in the running) is
specified with 100% certainty, one can interpret this as the
original FoD being deflated (i.e., the # of available candidates
are being reduced) to (c3, c4, c5). Therefore, we can generate
updated KB via FH Conditional as
Blk+1(B) = Blk(B | A), (6)
where B ⊆ Θ. Similar to the probabilistic case, the condition-
ing operation, redistributes originally cast voter preferences to
ONLY propositions that are subsets of A. Now, when A is
specified with less than 100% confidence as in Example 2,
one may utilize updating strategy similar to [36] to obtain,
Blk+1(B) = αk Blk(B) + βk(A) Blk(B | A), (7)
where the parameters αk and βk(A) are chosen to reflect
the confidence levels. In particular, for Example 2, one may
choose βk(A) = 0.75 and αk = 1 − βk(A) = 0.25. An
interpretation of αk is that it represents the integrity of current
KB (i.e., Blk()) in front of not 100% evidence. In fact,
depending on the maturity of the KB, one may choose an
αk not fully committing to incoming evidence (see [36] for a
detailed discussion). For instance, even if A∗ is 95% confident
in his assessment on c1 and c2, if the knowledge in existing
KB has much higher integrity, one may choose a higher αk,
say 0.80, thus only allowing small changes (20% in a very
loose sense) to the existing KB.
B. The Case of Two Disjoint Conditioning Events
In complex fusion environments, especially when evidence
is pooled from open sources, such as in crowd-sensing appli-
cations, it is highly unlikely that incoming evidence constitutes
of a single event along with a confidence value. Let us look at
a simplified scenario, where the incoming evidence constitutes
ONLY of two disjoint events.
Example 3 (MVP Poll v.3). Suppose the sports analyst A∗
in Example 2 has now gathered more evidence regarding the
condition of c1 and c2. Now, he’s 100% certain that either
event A1:= c1 and c2 will not return with 90% chance,
or otherwise event A2:= if they return, due to their utmost
dedication, only c1 and c2 will have a chance at the MVP.
Now, what is the best strategy to update Ek?
a) Probabilistic Case: Let us assume that current voter
preferences are stored in KB as Pk(), where k is the discrete
time index for current time tk. Now, the evidence is provided
via two disjoint events A1 = (c3, c4, c5) and A2 = (c1, c2).
For a proposition B ⊆ Θ, one may compute
Pk(B) = Pk(B|A1)Pk(A1) + Pk(B|A2)Pk(A2) (8)
Perhaps, one direct way to extend this notion of total prob-
ability to derive up update equation similar to equation (8),
while taking into account the less than perfect confidence of
incoming evidence and it’s impact on the integrity of the
KB (i.e., Pk(B)). Therefore, one may derive the intuitive
extension, similar to Eq. (7), as
Pk+1(B) = αkPk(B) + (1− α)[Pk(B|A1)P ∗k (A1)
+ Pk(B|A2)P ∗k (A2)
= αkPk(B) +
2∑
i=1
βk(Ai)Pk(B|Ai), (9)
where βk(Ai) = (1− αk)P ∗k (Ai) with αk +
∑
i βk(Ai) = 1.
Here, note that the support for each conditioning event Ai
as provided by E∗k is used. Perhaps, one may interpret this
as a weighted linear combination of conditioned evidence,
where the parameters βk(Ai) are directly proportional to the
support provided by incoming evidence to the conditioning
events Ai, i = 1, 2 as given by βk(Ai) = (1− αk)P ∗k (Ai).
b) Belief theoretic update: Now, one may directly extend
the same thought process in Eq. 9 as
Blk+1(B) = αk Blk(B) +
2∑
i=1
βk(Ai) Blk(B | Ai), (10)
where αk +
∑
i βk(Ai) = 1. Here, the parameters βk(Ai) to
be chosen s.t. they are directly proportional to the support for
event Ai as provided by E∗k .
C. The Case of Arbitrary (Multiple) Conditioning Events
The most general case can be analyzed when the incoming
evidence E∗k is expressed as a BoE E∗k ≡ {Θ,F∗k,m∗k()},
where the focal set F∗k and basic probability assignment m
∗
k()
containing the set of conditioning events and their support,
respectively.
Following the notion of generating updated belief as a
weighted linear combination of conditioned evidence, where
the parameters βk(Ai) are taken to be directly proportional to
the support provided by incoming evidence, one can extend
Eq. 11 for updating with arbitrary conditioning events.
Definition 4 (Generalized Conditional Update (GCU)). The
GCU that updates Ek ≡ {Θ,Fk,mk()} with the evidence in
E∗k ≡ {Θ,F∗k,m∗k()} is given by
Blk+1(B) = αk Blk(B) +
∑
A∈F∗k
βk(A) Blk(B | A), (11)
where the αk, βk() ∈ <+ satisfy αk +
∑
A∈F∗k
βk(A) = 1.
Remarks: The updating equations given by GCU proposed
in this paper and CUE in [33] have similar functional form.
However, the updating schemes are fundamentally different.
In particular,
— GCU conditions existing evidence Ek w.r.t. conditioning
events A ∈ F∗k provided by incoming evidence in E∗k , whereas
— CUE conditions incoming evidence E∗k within itself w.r.t.
A ∈ F∗k.
This fundamental difference generates interesting differ-
ences for evidence updating and provides different and distinct
features that maybe relevant in certain application contexts.
In fact, we show that GCU boils down to Bayes conditional
under the limiting conditions (i.e., αk = 0,∀k and mk=0() is
Bayesian), irrespective of the structure of incoming evidence
Ek. These features are directly influenced by the properties of
FH conditional operation.
IV. BEHAVIOR OF GCU
Understanding how the conditioning affects the focal ele-
ments in the current BoE is crucial to a proper understanding
of any updating process.
A. Focal Elements Generated via Conditioning
A theorem that explains the focal elements generated by
conditioning referred to as Conditional Core Theorem [38],
[39] can be utilized for this task.
Theorem 2 (Conditional Core Theorem (CCT)). [38] Given
A ∈ Fˆ in the BoE E = {Θ,F,m}, m(B|A) > 0 iff B can
be expressed as B = X ∪ Y , for some X ∈ in(A) and Y ∈
OUT(A)∪{∅}. Here, in(A) = {B ⊆ A | B ∈ F}, OUT(A) =
{B ⊆ A | B = ⋃i⊆I Ci, Ci ∈ out(A)}, where out(A) =
{B ⊆ A | B ∪ C ∈ F, ∅ 6= B, ∅ 6= C ⊆ A}.
The CCT implies that conditional focal elements can only
be generated from the disjunction of focal elements completely
contained in the conditioning proposition A and focal elements
that intersect but not included in A. For a comprehensive
discussion on CCT, we refer the interested reader to [39]. The
following example [38] illustrates the application of the CCT.
Example 4. [38] Consider the BoE, Ek ≡ {Θ,Fk,mk()}
with Θ = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i}, mk = {a, b, h, df, beg,Θ}
and mk(B) = {0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3}, for B ∈ Fk (in the
same order given in Fk). Then, for A = (abcde),
in(A) = {a, b}; out(A) = {d, be, abcde};
IN(A) = {a, b, ab}; OUT(A) = {d, be, bde, abcde}.
Note that, B = {ad, bd, be, abe, bde, abde, abcde}, are the only
propositions that can be expressed as B = X ∪ Y , for some
X ∈ in(A) and Y ∈ OUT(A). So, according to the CCT, the
nine elements of B and in(A) are the only propositions that
will belong to the conditional core (w.r.t. A = (abcde)).
in(A)
out(A)
d
be
be d
OUT(A)
abcde
abcde
A
a
b
f
be
⇥
a
h
d
g
b
d be
Fig. 2. Illustration of the application of CCT for conditioning
Ek = {Θ,Fk,mk()} with Θ = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i}, m =
{a, b, h, df, beg,Θ} and m(B) = {0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3} w.r.t. the
conditioning event A = (abcde).
B. Impact on the Updating Process
The conditioning operation has a direct impact on the
updating process. For pedagogical ease, let us consider the
update with αk = 0, i.e., Ek+1 will only contain focal elements
that are generated via conditioning.
(a) If proposition B was not contained in at least one the
conditioning events A ∈ F∗k (i.e., B 6⊆ A, ∀A ∈ F∗k), then B
cannot belong to Fk+1.
(b) For a proposition B that was contained in at least one
conditioning event A ∈ F∗k,
(b.1) if B ∈ Fk (i.e., it is a focal element in Ek), then B
belongs to Fk+1.
(b.2) if B 6∈ Fk, then B belongs to Fk+1 iff it can be
expressed as the union of
(i) a focal element Bˆ ∈ Fk that is contained in a
conditioning event A ∈ F∗k; and
(ii) the intersection of A with some arbitrary set of
focal elements B˜ ∈ Fk each of which straddles A and its
complement A (see Fig. 2).
These properties clearly identifies how new propositions
will be generated or existing propositions will be removed
via conditioning operations. Furthermore,
(d) for each conditioning operation, if there are no focal
elements that straddle any of the conditioning events A ∈ F∗k
and its complement, then Fk+1 = Fk;
(e) propositions with zero belief does not belong to Fk+1.
Therefore, with the exception of newly created focal ele-
ments (from straddling propositions as explained about), when
α = 0 (i.e., completely update existing BoE with incoming
evidence as in Bayes conditioning), the FH conditioning
in GCU eliminates all propositions that were in complete
disagreement with ALL conditioning events (as in the Bayes
Conditioning).
Now, when αk > 0, the core Fk+1 of updated BoE Ek+1
also retains all the focal elements that were contained in Fk.
Since Fk+1 retains all focal elements that were contained in at
least one of the conditioning events A ∈ F∗k (as is the case in
Bayes Conditioning), it is interesting to look at the asymptotic
behavior of propositions that are not supported by incoming
evidence. Furthermore, how one initiates the updating process,
or in other words, the initial mass assignments or the priors,
will also have a clear impact on the final updated BoEs. In
particular, it is easy to see that the vacuous initial assignment
(i.e., mk=0(Θ) = 1.0) as a representation of complete ambi-
guity would not generate any refined BoEs irrespective of the
incoming evidence.
C. Vacuous Updating
Let EΘ denote the vacuous BoE, i.e., the complete ambiguity
often represented by EΘ = {Θ,Θ,m(Θ) = 1.0}.
(i) Case 1: Ek+1 := EΘ C E∗k , i.e., updating a vacuous
BoE with an arbitrary BoE: GCU generates Ek+1 = EΘ,
irrespective of parameter selection. In particular, if one initiates
an updating process with Ek=0 = EΘ, perhaps due to lack
of prior information, Ek+1 := Ek C E∗k = EΘ, for all k. In
other words, the KB continues to remain vacuous irrespective
of the parameter selection or the incoming evidence. Obvi-
ously, conditioning only generates a refinement of originally
cast evidence, and therefore proper selection of initial basic
probability assignment (or priors) is crucial with the use of
GCU.
(ii) Case 2: Ek+1 := Ek C EΘ, i.e., updating an arbitrary
BoE with a vacuous BoE: GCU generates Ek+1 = Ek, again,
irrespective of parameter selection. In particular, if one carries
out n updates as Ei+1 := Ei C EΘ, for i = k, . . . , k + n − 1,
then, irrespective of GCU parameters, Ek+n := Ek. Therefore,
GCU updates are tolerant against complete sensor failures in
the sense that it will not complete erode an existing KB with
vacuous incoming evidence.
D. Selection of GCU Parameters
GCU provides flexibility in parameter selection in order
to accommodate the integrity of the existing knowledge-
base, reliability of sensors and other application specific
requirements. How one goes about selecting the appropriate
parameter configuration however is is highly dependent on the
application and domain. The work in [33], [34], [36] details
several parameter selection strategies for CUE-based evidence
updating. These strategies remain applicable for GCU. We do
not intend to repeat a detailed description of these strategies
here; the interested reader may refer to [32], [34], [36].
a) Selection of αk: The work in [36] provides several
strategies for selection of αk w.r.t. the “inertia of existing body
of evidence.” In particular, (i) infinite inertia-based selection:
αk = 1; (ii) zero inertia-based selection: αk = 0; and,
(iii) proportional inertia-based selection: k/(k+1), where k
current discrete time index.
b) Selection of βk(): These weights allow one to
emphasize/de-emphasize the propositions within each condi-
tioning set A. Two very interesting choices that are inspired
by the work in [32], [34], [36] are the following:
(i) The receptive strategy: βk(A) = Kkm∗k(A), ∀A ∈ F∗k,
where Kk 6= 0 is a constant. This receptive strategy ‘weighs’
the incoming evidence from E∗k according to the support E∗k
itself has for it. In other words, the BoE that is being updated is
‘receptive’ to the support (assigned to the conditioning events)
from incoming evidence E∗k .
(ii) The cautious strategy: βk(A) = Kkmk(A), ∀A ∈ Fk,
where Kk 6= 0 is a constant. This strategy ‘weights’ the
incoming evidence from E∗k according to the support Ek itself
has for it. In other words, being KB is being ‘cautious’ as to
what events are in fact used for conditioning (or refining).
E. Selection of Priors or Initial Mass Assignment
DS theoretic sensor fusion methods are perhaps popular
for its ability to conveniently ambiguous data, especially
ignorance. For instance, with lack of information, one may
start a fusion process by initializing E0 with m0(Θ) = 1.0,
whereas in Bayesian probability, one may choose an approach,
such as uniform priors. Unlike combination operators, since
conditioning generates a refinement by redistributing initial
mass assignments within the conditioning event(s), proper
selection of initial mass assignment is crucial with GCU.
a) Selecting a vacuous BoE for E0: As shown, the uddate
Ek+1 := EΘCE∗k generates Ek+1 = EΘ. Therefore, irrespective
of E∗k , vacuous initial mass assignment will result in Ek→∞ =
EΘ.
b) Selecting a uniform mass assignment for E0: As in
probability theory, one may utilize a uniform assignment, as
m0(θi) = 1/|Θ|, i = 1, . . . , |Θ|.
c) Selecting a Dirichlet BoE for E0: Another, perhaps
more ‘DS like’ assignment strategy is to utilize, a Dirichlet
BoE. With an application/context related parameter 0 < γ < 1,
one may initialize the updating process as, m0(θi) = (1 −
γ)/|Θ|, i = 1, . . . , |Θ| and m0(Θ) = γ. Perhaps, the gamma
maybe chosen to represent the ‘ignorance’ associated with
initial assignment.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Robust belief revision methods are crucial in streaming data
situations for updating existing knowledge or beliefs with new
incoming evidence. By viewing the evidence updating process
as a thought experiment, a novel evidence updating strategy
referred to as the GCU (i.e., generalized conditional update)
is derived, especially targeting efficient belief revision and un-
certainty handling in big-data stream-processing applications.
The GCU generalizes the belief theoretic notion of Fagin-
Halpern conditional, thus allowing one to account for various
data/source imperfections that are characteristic to complex
big-data fusion environments. The presented extension differs
fundamentally from the previously published work on the con-
ditional approach referred to as CUE (i.e., Conditional Update
Equation) as well as authors own extensions of it. The GCU,
the proposed evidence updating strategy based on a belief
theoretic conditional approach, possesses several intuitively
appealing features which seem to indicate its suitability for
scenarios where large amounts of data/source uncertainties are
present. In particular, the initial basic belief assignment (or the
priors) is fundamentally different from CUE and it’s counter-
parts. As shown in the derivations, a vacuous assignment as
prior or initial basic probability assignment (as often done
in Dempster-Shafer settings) is shown to generate inaccurate
results. Among issues that warrant further investigation, of
particular importance is the computational complexity that
hampers the use of DS theoretic methods when working with
a high number of sources and/or source FoDs having high
cardinality.
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